brookings institute funded by china

The United States cannot (and does not want to) compete dollar for dollar in countries where the Belt and Road Initiative is making large investments in infrastructure. In particular, how do politics, economics, security dynamics, as well as regional and geo-political considerations intersect in defining Chinas relationship with the region and its strategy toward it? What kinds of immigration policies and partnerships (between public and private sectors, and between governments) could support that goal? China's smart cities market is estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion, and three Chinese entities dominate smart city. What impact does great power dynamics have on U.S. efforts to manage the China challenge? Fortunately, there are steps that the United States, working in partnership with other democratic governments, can take to safeguard democracy and liberal values in an age of AI. Looking to the longer term, there is a need for more development finance to support infrastructure and other public services. These findings will help shape discourse on the tools available to the United States and its partners to address Chinese behaviors of concern. Highlight the major dimensions of Chinese influence within key global (and powerful regional) frameworks and institutions, and their strategies for achieving it; and parse the distinction between those areas where increased Chinese influence is injurious to U.S. interests and Western values, those where it is not consequential, and those where it is constructive; Examine Chinas strategies in those global fora that are seeking to develop frameworks for the global governance of under-regulated domains, especially technology (in conversation with the working group on tech) and space; Propose U.S. and Western strategies for response. In other words, what must the United States achieve and avoid with China? Reducing methane emissions can provide outsized near-term benefits in reducing warming, a crucial benefit in a transition that is bound to take time. These include: What approach can the U.S. pursue across strategic domains to integrate economic, military, and diplomatic measures to avoid conflict with China? Brookings is now launching Phase 2 of the Global China Project which builds upon the research and analysis of the first phase, and shifts toward prescription, focusing on advancing recommendations on how the United States should respond to Chinas actions that implicate key American interests and values. How does China view its strategic requirements in East Asia as it expands its global influence and footprint? According to Open Secrets, Brookings has donated 96% or $824,259 to Democratic candidates and causes since 1990. Chinese smart cities provide another example of Chinas ability to derive something innovative from pre-existing technologies. The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent, in-depth research that leads to pragmatic and innovative ideas on how to solve problems facing society.. China has emerged as a truly global actor, impacting every region and every major issue area. Our records indicate this scholar adhered to these policies regarding reimbursement and disclosure.) West attended Huaweis fourth annual European Innovation Day in Paris in 2016, where he shared his thoughts on how wireless technology is reshaping our lives, according to a Huawei press release. That includes both techniques for pushing back against growing Chinese influence, but also possibly strategies for advancing the use of global order frameworks as devices for helping to manage the bilateral relationship. The subsequent closure of CIs at two universities attracted congressional scrutiny and prompted a series of dueling reports. The transportation and industrial sectors are important to both countries and ideally the U.S. and China can work together on technology development and implementation to electrify and decarbonize these two difficult sectors. What steps can it take in coordination with allies to increase the probability of maintaining Chinas dependence on imports of AI chips? As a result of the COVID pandemic and recession, debt burdens that had seemed prudent in many cases are now unsustainable. In this context, it is essential to mitigate the risks of U.S.-China war over Taiwan in particular. Brookings's reports do not disclose specific contribution amounts but instead categorize donors into ranges. The Brookings Institution, whose predecessor was founded in 1918 by Robert Brookings, was probably the first think tank in the USA. information clearinghouse on Chinese CI personnel in the U.S. interest among U.S. students has been declining, American views of China more generally have plunge, concerns relating to study within the PRC, decreased U.S. government higher education, difficulty finding qualified Mandarin teachers, reassess the concerns, evidence and U.S. actions taken, does not impinge on the academic freedom or institutional autonomy, continue to be pressed by bipartisan Congressional coalitions, South Korean-American pie: Unpacking the US-South Korea summit, Germanys China dilemma takes on a new urgency, Americans show signs of impatience with Ukraine war. It is modernizing its forces with a range of advanced technologies while preparing a nuclear weapons buildup that could make it a near-peer of the United States by the nuclear metric within a decade or so. An influential 2017 study of 12 CIs by the National Association of Scholars identified a range of concerns including transparency, contractual language, academic freedom and pressure to self-censor. Yet, there are investments, trade relationships, and markets that countries on the receiving end of Chinas infrastructure investments seek from the United States that are qualitatively different from what China offers. As we watch the Chinese Communist Party celebrate its centennial anniversary in 2021, many observers have noted that China has moved away from traditional communism and more towards a system that fits its modern needsSocialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, as designated by Xi Jinping himself. In fact, the Chinese government has been pushing its tech industry to move beyond copycat methods. Qi Ye was appointed director. Although Japanese and South Korean firms also sit within the top ten holders of smart city patents, State Grid Corporations 7,156 patents in November 2020 was more than double second-ranked Samsungs mere 3,148 patents. Our group seeks to explore the following questions: Our broader work will include research on the strategic and military significance of Chinese incorporation of Taiwan into its territory as well as work on integrated deterrence and on forecasting war outcomes over Taiwan. A 2019 report from Chinas National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) even attempts to differentiate Chinese smart cities from foreign ones; the latter focus on the management of things, while the Chinese version focuses on people. Analysis / Bias What are the set of core U.S. national interests that should result in strategic and well-resourced Indo-Pacific initiatives? To some extent, they werent entirely wrong. CIs generated legitimate concerns about academic freedom and independence due to their direct support from, and admitted role as a soft power instrument for, Chinas party-state. West has spoken at several Huawei events. China now touches virtually every region in the world how is Chinas increasing involvement impacting South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and elsewhere? Some CIs specialized in areas such as healthcare, business, Chinese food and beverage culture, and Chinese film. China aspires to global technology leadership. To be sure, some private U.S. NGOs offer Mandarin learning, including an Asia Society program with 35,000 students studying Chinese in 100 K-12 schools around the country that are linked with sister schools in China. How can we define Chinas economic and security influence and role in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa? Is China interfering in American politics? The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, DC. However, the legal, illegal, and extralegal appropriation of foreign technologies and products is only one part of the story. Individuals are able to do almost anything using the app, from ordering food and paying bills to filing for divorce and applying for visas. Isaac Stone Fish: Why are U.S. companies working for a Chinese firm thats implicated in ethnic cleansing? What are the range of Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific that challenge U.S. security and economic interests as well as those that leave room for coordination and cooperation? Total revenues $67,901,806 2021 20172018201920202021$60m$0.1b Total expenses $85,684,378 2021 20172018201920202021$80m$0.1b Total assets $568,244,186 2021 20172018201920202021$0.5b$0.5b$0.6b Num. "For this reason, I have been convening meetings between the . He was China Director at the National Security Council from 2013 to 2017 and served in the U.S. embassy in . What measures can Washington adopt to ensure that United States and allies remain one to two generations ahead in semiconductor manufacturing and other high-end hardware? Despite the huge amount of capital (estimated to be upwards of $150 billion USD from 2014 through 2030) and resources that Beijing has poured into bolstering Chinas domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity, many of the countrys leading firms are struggling to realize the governments goals. U.S.-China relationship is undergoing a transition toward intensifying rivalry even as it remains highly interdependent across a range of domains. This working group will look at the following issues: The working group will produce a set of specific recommendations, some for China and the U.S. to pursue unilaterally and others for them to pursue collaboratively. However, U.S.China relations deteriorated in the intervening years. In what ways do Chinas relations with India create opportunities and challenges for the United States? What is the range of Americas policy options given its own interests in the region in terms of both economic and security strategy and where can it improve on current policy choices? Regardless, CIUS could usefully serve as a visa sponsor, as do some states and nonprofits like the Cordell Hull Foundation, for U.S.-based CIs. Beijings re-innovation strategy is key element of U.S.-China competition, effectively curbing its only potential rival. Nor can the possibility of direct U.S.-China conflict be dismissed should there be another Korean War. Lindsey W. Ford, Tarun Chhabra, and Ryan Hass, A conversation on the US approach to the Peoples Republic of China with Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman, Global China: US-China relations through the lens of technology competition, Global China: US-China relations through the lens of great power competition, Global China: Assessing Chinas growing role in the world, Global China: Assessing Beijings growing influence in the international system, Global China: Examining Chinas approach to global governance and norms, Global China Webinar: Assessing Chinas growing regional influence and strategy, Webinar: Global China Assessing Chinas technological reach in the world, Global China: Assessing Chinas relations with the great powers, Global China: Assessing Chinas role in East Asia, Global China: Assessing Chinas growing role in the world and implications for U.S.-China strategic competition, Chinas choices and the fate of the post-post-Cold War era, Ukraine presents opportunity to test Chinas strategic outlook, Around the halls: Implications of Russias invasion of Ukraine, Pavel K. Baev, Jessica Brandt, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Jeremy Greenwood, Samantha Gross, Daniel S. Hamilton, Bruce Jones, Marvin Kalb, Patricia M. Kim, Suzanne Maloney, Amy J. Nelson, Thomas Pickering, Bruce Riedel, Natan Sachs, Constanze Stelzenmller, Caitlin Talmadge, Shibley Telhami, David G. Victor, and Andrew Yeo, Learning the right lessons from Ukraine for Taiwan, Ryan Hass, Patricia M. Kim, Emilie Kimball, Jessica Brandt, David Dollar, Cameron F. Kerry, Aaron Klein, Joshua P. Meltzer, Chris Meserole, Amy J. Nelson, Pavneet Singh, Melanie W. Sisson, and Thomas Wright, Global China: Assessing Chinas Growing Role in the World, Edited by Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass, and Emilie Kimball, Balancing act: Major powers and the global response to US-China great power competition, Fiona Hill, Tanvi Madan, Amanda Sloat, Mireya Sols, Constanze Stelzenmller, Bruce Jones, Emilie Kimball, Jesse I. Kornbluth, and Ted Reinert, Playing with fire: Italy, China, and Europe, Charts of the Week: Chinas rising economic and military spending, Rethinking US-China competition: Next generation perspectives, Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Bruce Jones, and Will Moreland. Documents obtained by prosecutors indicate that John R. Allen, a retired general and the head of the prestigious think tank . Has Chinese aid benefited recipient countries? Over 30 of the universities, as well as the College Board, that ended CI partnerships since 2017 did so under political pressure that threatened loss of federal fundingnot over concerns of Chinese interference or declining interest. The GAO found that, although 42 of the 90 agreements contained confidentiality clauses, many agreements are publicly available, either posted online, as at least 11 universities did, through state open records laws, or upon request. This number includes at least seven CIs that are scheduled to close in 2021. It should also consider authorizing the Confucius Institute U.S. Center (CIUS) to serve as a visa sponsor to assist Chinese teachers and staff of CIs obtain the proper visas, as well as enable CIUS to serve as a clearinghouse for information on such PRC personnel for relevant U.S. government agencies. Has US-China rivalry passed a tipping point? But Wests most eyebrow-raising speaking event came in November 2017, when he presented the findings of his October report at a Huawei conference in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur. It urged closing all CIs and suggested prudential measures for universities that refused to do so. About the Tax Policy Center. Budget cuts impacting universities ability to finance their share of operating costs, coronavirus obstacles and low Mandarin class enrollment, compounded by federal government funding restrictions, may mean the end of CIs after a 15-year, generally controversy-free record in the United States. The author thanks James Haynes, former Research Assistant, and intern Jingye Huang - Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution, and Mia Shuang Li and research assistant Claire Ren Yixin of the Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center, for valuable research assistance and insights. What are the key dynamics and salient issues at play in Chinas relationship with the region? How do President Xi Jinpings personal ambitions and the centralization of power in the Chinese Communist Party affect Chinas approach to foreign policy? The Institution's founder, philanthropist Robert S. Brookings (1850-1932), originally created three organizations: the Institute for Government Research, the Institute of Economics (with funds from the Carnegie Corporation ), and the Robert Brookings Graduate School affiliated with Washington University in St. Louis. Beijings move to establish a comprehensive technology transfer system is founded on the assumption that these strategic technologies will make their way to China in order to be re-innovated, not just copied. As the analyst Arthur Kroeber argues in Chinas Economy, Chinese firms are good at adaptive innovationthe concept of taking existing products, services, or processes and modifying them to make them more receptive to Chinas economic and military needs. So when Chinas Peoples Liberation Army unveiled its J-20 stealth fighter in 2011, it caused an uproar in U.S. defense circles because of its similarity to American equivalents and seemed to confirm the perception of China as reliant on copying the work of others. Confrontation, competition, and cooperation between the U.S. and China will affect the environment for global economic growth, especially growth and poverty reduction in the developing world in the decades to come. This rebranding is unlikely to relieve suspicions about the role of CIs in Chinas soft power projection. Brookings will not accept gifts from donors who seek to undermine the independence of its scholars research or otherwise to predetermine or influence recommendations.). [2] This project is a 135MW gas to power plant by Sinohydro (a brand of Power Construction Corporation of China) and Supreme Trading. Rather than copying capitalist systems like that of the United States, the Chinese government has sought to create a system that, through various formal and informal channels, promotes connectivity between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nominally private Chinese enterprises. However, the overwhelming desire of the leaders in both nations to work together to counter American dominance has brought them increasingly closer together in recent years. Sometimes, they have co-directors from China and the United States but many are directed by a U.S. faculty director and a Chinese deputy. Implementation of the U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s, issued at the Glasgow Conference of the Parties in November 2021, focuses on the degree to which the United States and China will cooperate on climate issues. Our goal is to help the public, the media, and policymakers make informed decisions about critical fiscal issues and support better policy outcomes. For China, Taiwan is a matter of national unity and righting historical wrongs. Some questions this group will explore include: China is increasingly using diplomatic and economic tools to challenge the terms of global order and governance; how should the United States and others respond? How can Washington ensure that democracies take the lead in privacy-preserving machine learning, explainable machine learning, and AI safety? The Brookings Institution, a prominent Washington, D.C., think tank, partnered with a Shanghai policy center that the FBI has described as a front for China's intelligence and spy recruitment. It should disaggregate legitimate national security concerns, including Chinese espionage and technology theft, from academic freedom issues that are best left to our universities. Even before Xi, the Medium- to Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development (MLP), released in 2006, states that building an innovation-oriented country is a major strategic choice for Chinas future development. Brookings Institution is a 501 (c) (3) non-profit organization funded through donations. The program aims to build the research and analytical skills of NGO leaders and academics who have substantial experience and ties to developing countries. As part of our commitment to transparency, Huaweis support for the Governance Studies program at Brookings is listed in our 2018, 2017, and 2013 Annual Reports, which are the only years for which contributions were received from the company, said Horne. Yet, interest among U.S. students has been declining since peaking around 2011, as American views of China more generally have plunged to the lowest level since polling began. Now, its also increasing its influence in the instruments of international security governance as wellincluding around core concepts like sovereignty, the role of alliances, of democracy, freedom of navigationand in that set of international institutions that provide the regulatory undergirding of globalization. Mr. Xie held the same position in the lead-up to the 2015 Paris Agreement, and the joint announcement of the U.S. and Chinas Paris Agreement pledges at the end of 2014 was a key event to generate momentum for the Paris process and signal that the two largest emitters were taking it seriously. U.S. export controls on chip design software and foundry machine tools have also crippled Huaweis HiSilicon, effectively curbing its only potential rival to U.S. advanced chips. These dynamics make the modern U.S.-China relationship unique in the international system. In contrast, a 2018 joint Hoover Institute-Asia Society study of Chinese influence activities in the U.S., which acknowledged concerns that campus-based CIs might potentially infringe on academic freedomand made similar recommendations to reduce potential risksfound no actual interference by CIs in mainstream Chinese studies curricula on U.S. campuses and that most CIs operate without controversy. From 2018-2020, the Brookings Global China project produced one of the largest open source diagnostic assessments of Chinas actions in every major geographic and functional domain. To drive the development of new policy thinking for Americas approach to China, this working group will examine several central questions as well as other issues that are derivative of them. But China is not just a growing military power; its also increasingly intent on wielding a combination of diplomatic and economic tools to challenge or reshape the terms and conditions of global order and global governance. Government guidance funds (GGFs) are a perfect representation of this interconnectivity in action. That formidable task requires the U.S. to foster more realistic and actionable expectations, criticisms and commitments, rather than policies and actions based on an alarmist China caricature that does not reflect the more complex reality of that country, its people and its behavior abroad. Yi Gang, then deputy governor of the People's Bank of China, speaks at a 2016 event held by the Brookings Institution in Washington about China and the world economy. Beijing will want to visibly register its displeasure, lest its leaders be accused at home of tolerating Taiwans efforts to move further away from China. The Indo-Pacific is the worlds most dynamic economic region and is home to several mature democracies with advanced technological capabilities which are long-time allies or close partners of the United States. COVID is a classic current example. A few examples: Brookings . The relationship is tilted toward long-term systemic rivalry, but it is not an exclusively rivalrous relationship. The U.S. government launched an initiative with Taiwan in December 2020 to expand existing Mandarin language opportunities in the U.S. and help fill a gap created by CI closings. Visa issues for visiting teachers have prompted suspensions and contributed to cancellation of some CI programs. The verdict likely will need to be viewed on a case-by-case basis. Thanks to these efforts, Chinese universities are climbing global rankings, with Peking University and Tsinghua University among U.S. News and World Reports top 100 global universities in 2021. GGFs provide a number of benefits, including by helping Chinese policymakers leverage market discipline and expertise and by offering long-term, stable investment capital to startups, helping them to cross the valley of death, the stage between discovery and commercialization. Chinas leadership understands the challenges facing SOEs in being innovative and has built systems to address them. The American hub-and-spoke alliance system is increasingly operating in tandem with networked security arrangements such as the Quad, AUKUS, and a host of issue-specific bilaterals and trilaterals. His connection with Huawei goes back at least to 2012, when he spoke about broadband development at a Huawei conference in Barcelona, according to Huaweis website. The Brookings Doha Center, an arm of the think tank in Qatar's capital that focuses on Middle East issues, is funded largely by the Qatari government, which has pledged $21.6 million to . . Perhaps the most important example of Chinas efforts to innovate technologicallyand in key ways surpass the United Statesis WeChat. What are the policy implications for the United States overall economic competitiveness and its national security? At the same time, Beijing also will want to preserve some headroom for further escalation should future circumstances require. It will also explore whether the great powers can cooperate on common global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and nuclear non-proliferation. China is running out of productive places to invest in infrastructure, and rising debt levels will further complicate its growth path. After the 2019 Senate study found nearly 70 percent of universities that received more than $250,000 from Hanban failed to properly file, the drive focused on China, even though other countries were larger donors to U.S. higher education.The DOE report on the initiatives results referenced CIs in connection with concerns that foreign money buys influence or control over teaching and research. Widespread non-compliance with the reporting requirement, more a matter of confusion, rather than secrecy, prompted a new DOE reporting portal in June 2020. Powering a Clean Energy Future. On April 27, The Hamilton Project and the Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability will convene leaders and experts to examine the future of clean energy innovation and deployment. In an era of tight funding for and decline of interest in Chinese language and culture programs, and a clear need for cultivating Mandarin speakers and China expertise across multiple disciplines, the modest financial contribution and native Mandarin language professionals provided through an appropriately managed Confucius Institute network should be welcomed, not castigated. What if any historical lessons can be drawn from past instances of great power competition and applied to the modern conduct of U.S.-China relations? The provisions seek to lessen U.S. reliance on foreign manufacturing sources, while investing in a local . What are the implications of Chinese activity across various strategic domains security, infrastructure, economic statecraft, and more for the United States? Ryan Hass, Emilie Kimball, and Bill Finan, Global China is contesting the US-led order, Rush Doshi, Lindsey W. Ford, and Ryan Hass, The global competition to govern digital trade, Global Chinas energy and climate policies, Jeffrey Ball, Lindsey W. Ford, and Samantha Gross, Lindsey W. Ford, Bruce Riedel, and Natan Sachs, Global Chinas ambitions in the Indian Ocean region, Lindsey W. Ford, Zach Vertin, and Joshua T. White, Technology competition between the US and a Global China, Lindsey W. Ford, Chris Meserole, and Tom Stefanick, 5G Deployment and Digital Competition with China, Margaret Taylor, Tom Wheeler, and Nicol Turner Lee, Global Chinas advanced technology ambitions, Lindsey W. Ford, Saif M. Khan, and Remco Zwetsloot, Global Chinas ambitions across East Asia, Lindsey W. Ford, Richard C. Bush, Jonathan Stromseth, and Lynn Kuok, Global Chinas plan for overseas military bases, Lindsey W. Ford, Mara Karlin, and Leah Dreyfuss, Deterring military conflict with a global China, Lindsey W. Ford, Michael E. OHanlon, and Caitlin Talmadge, Chinese domestic politics in the rise of global China.
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